Is it wrong to own more than one house?

The Week in Housing 25/04/25

Housing and philosophy don’t usually go together, but this week I’m looking at a recent academic article that sets out a philosophical argument for the redistribution of ownership. This is something I have become very interested in, especially since ‘acquisition’ schemes (acquiring second hand private housing for use as social/cost rental) are growing in prominence in Ireland and internationally.

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When it comes to housing, the idea of equality is rarely directly explored. Generally, we tend to think that everyone should have access to some minimum of housing. This is sometimes called a ‘basic equality’ or ‘sufficientarian’ perspective. But we don’t generally ask whether, beyond this, disparities in the level of housing people can access is legitimate or desirable. In other words, we don’t tend to worry if some people live in mansions and others in more basic dwellings, as long as everyone has somewhere reasonably decent to live.

But over the last few decades the big story in housing has been the growing concentration of ownership of housing: more housing is in fewer hands. This has come about through the decline of homeownership and social housing, and the consequent growth of the PRS. Although it is rarely acknowledged, when the PRS grows it inherently means that the ownership of residential property becomes more concentrated. Moreover, the growth of holiday homes and Airb BnB style short term lets has further concentrated property ownership.

Housing has become concentrated both through the growth of households of ‘multiple property ownership’ and through the rise of institutional landlords (see this recent post). In my view, this means that consideration of the philosophical, ethical and normative questions around the concentration of property ownership will become more pressing in politics and public debate. We can already see this happening in the discourses of some tenant activist groups. The Barcelona Tenants Union, for example, argues that the current housing system is like playing a game of monopoly in which all the property is already owned by other players, i.e. inherently unfair or ‘rigged’.

Introducing limitarianism

A recent article by philosopher Susan Erck looks at the philosophical argument that owning ‘excess’ housing is morally wrong, drawing on the concept of ‘limitarianism’ (the below quotes are all from this article). Limitarianism is not an argument for equality of outcome, “sameness in everyone’s housing situation”, but for “confronting the upper tail of the distribution of housing wealth”.

The general (i.e. beyond house specifically) limitarian argument is that limits should be placed on income/wealth if certain conditions pertain, i.e. under these conditions it “is morally wrong to possess/consume more economic/material resources than one needs to fully flourish”.

The relevant conditions include: (a) the existence of extreme deprivation, which could be ameliorated through government-led actions; and (b) the existence of urgent collective-action problems that could be addressed by government and require financial resources.

Housing limitarianism, similarly, asserts that it is “wrong to possess excess housing”. The relevant conditions here are: (a) the existence of material housing deprivation; (b) the use of residential real estate as a profit generating commodity that undermines the fair and effective fulfilment of housing needs.

Limitarianism and ‘urgent needs’

Erck puts forward two core arguments that support this perspective. The first is the ‘urgent needs’ argument. This is the idea that “having too much housing might be impermissible in a society where others do not have enough”, and therefore housing can be justly redistributed from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have nots’. A case in point would be the existence of holiday homes at the same time as homelessness, which does seem morally difficult to justify.

The ’urgent needs’ argument is a version of the American philosopher Thomas Scanlon’s Rescue Principle, which asserts that “if you are presented with a situation in which you can prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so”.

Property owning democracy

The second core argument is Rawl’s ‘property-owning democracy’. As many will know, John Rawls is by far the most influential theorist of justice. The idea of a property-owning democracy is to put “all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality”. The concept of property-owning democracy justifies breaking up concentrated ownership of the ‘means of production’ (i.e. economic resources), “thus preventing a wealthy few from attaining a disproportionate amount of economic control and, by extension, undue political influence”. There is a strong argument that highly concentrated ownership of economic resources is incompatible with, or at least in tension with, democracy (witness the current shit show in the US).

Redistributing housing to extend homeownership

In terms of housing, “discouraging extensive ownership of residential real estate by the superrich and corporate entities could facilitate a greater dispersal of ownership… throughout society”.

Taking the two above points together, dispersing or redistributing ownership of housing is justified if it leads to (a) increased access to housing for the ‘have nots’ without imposing much suffering on the ‘haves’ and (b) increased rates of homeownership.

Erck justifies the focus on homeownership on the basis that it “promotes a connection to place, encourages local political participation, and fosters a sense of autonomy and nondomination, all of which contribute to the social bases of an individual’s self-respect”.

In practice, this might mean that an “outright prohibition or wealth tax on surplus housing could be implemented to break up existing concentrations of housing ownership”. It could also be said to justify some forms of expropriation, such as Berlin’s Deutche Wohnen und Co. campaign or Singapore’s famous expropriation of land.

Erck also notes that the aim would not be to eliminate renting entirely, but rather to eliminate ‘non voluntary renting’, such that homeownership is genuinely accessible throughout all segments of society.

Problems with limtarianism

Overall, I find these arguments persuasive, but I would raise a few concerns:

1. The conditions in which housing limitarianism is said to be legitimate (i.e. the existence of housing deprivation and negative housing outcomes linked to the use of housing as a commodity) are more or less universal, and therefore limitarianism seems to grant enormous scope to Government that, at the very least, raises concerns about the functioning of housing markets and the right to ownership of property.

2. Erck focuses on homeownership but this seems to be based on a somewhat ideological conception of homeownership as inherently superior. There might be a case of this, but it is not something we can take for granted.

3. Erck neglects that housing can be redistributed not only by widening homeownership, but also by collectivising ownership through social and public housing, cooperatives ad community land trusts. This avenue achieves the stated goals of housing limtarianism because it deconcentrates private ownership of housing and increases access to decent and affordable housing.

4. The limitarian perspective seems to be based on a ‘static’ conception of housing systems. In other words, it seems to assume that there is a given stock of housing and then considers the normative basis for how this stock is distributed. However, housing systems are not static but dynamic, and a key feature of how they operate is not just how the existing stock is distributed but also how new stock is added. Assuming the provision of market housing is a feature of how new stock is added, mechanisms to distribute the existing stock need to be designed in a way that does not undermine the provision of new stock, for example by disincentivizing investment. For example, a more equitable distribution of the existing stock, via taxation on multiple property ownership, could lead to an undue reduction of new supply leading to worse housing outcomes, including for those who are worst off. This seems to contradict one of limitarianism’s main aims of reducing housing deprivation. This raises the question of whether or not a philosophical/normative framework could be developed which provides a moral grounding for both (a) the distribution of housing and (b) a fair approach to the supply of new housing.

4. The concept of property owning democracy, as I understand it, relates to the ‘means of production’ in the sense of productive economic resources. While housing is indeed an asset (and therefore closely related to wealth inequality), it is not a productive resource as such, e.g. it does not give owners control over the generation of employment or how societies’ economic resources are deployed. These types of issues seem to have a more direct bearing on democracy than ownership of housing. I’m therefore unsure if Rawls’ views on property owning democracy can be extended to housing. On the other hand, ownership of housing does have a direct bearing on urban democracy, i.e. decisions about who and what ‘the city’ is for. This line of thinking has been developed in the ‘right to the city’ literature.

Despite these concerns, my sense is that something like a limitarian perspective is extremely valuable if it can provide a clear normative grounding for concerns around the excessive concentration of ownership of residential property.

Events & news

The latest Social Housing Construction Status report was published this week. A reminder that The next instalment of our Making Rental Housing Affordable series will take place on May 21st and focuses on Danish Cost Rental - register here. The next Simon Talks webinar will focus on mental health and homelessness (April 29th). The International Social Housing Festival will take place in Dublin this year, June 4-6 (please note, this is not actually a festival but rather the opposite of a festival, i.e. a conference).

What I’m reading

Ronan Lyons has a new piece on RPZs and international rent controls in the Currency. This article on rent controls came out last year but I just got around to reading it this week, it gives an interesting insight into the perspective of tenant unions across multiple countries. I managed to get my hands on a copy of Aideen Hayden’s new book on tenant purchase, really looking forward to reading it.