Housing & anti-immigrant politics: part II
Bonus post 28/04/25
This is the second in a two-parter on migration, housing and populist politics. The first part looked at the international evidence on the drivers of populist politics and anti-immigrant sentiment. The below part looks more specifically at the idea of ‘resource scarcity’, immigrants’ housing situation in Ireland, and concludes with some reflections on how to most effectively address the intuitive idea that reducing immigration can solve the housing crisis. This post goes out to paid subscribers today and to all subscribers in a fortnight.
As noted in the first installment of this series, the economic drivers associated with populist politics in the international literature (globalization impacts and economic inequality) do not really apply to Ireland. Therefore, if there is an economic driver to rising anti-immigrant sentiment here it must be via resource scarcity. In terms of my focus, this obviously means competition for housing, be that market housing or social housing.
Here again we can draw on some international literature. Research by Cavaillé and Ferwerda (2023) examines the impact of an EU directive that compelled Austrian municipalities to open up social housing to previously excluded immigrants. They find that:
[M]unicipalities in Austria and electoral wards in Vienna most affected by the legal change were also more likely… to increase their support for anti-immigrant parties in the 2006 legislative elections.
The authors thus argue that, in municipalities where public housing is an important tenure, perceived housing competition drives anti-immigrant sentiment and voting.
In the Netherlands, research found that ‘lower-middle-income voters become less supportive of immigrants’ social rights when more social housing in their municipality is allocated to refugees’. In contrast, however, ‘competition does not reduce support [for immigrants’ social rights] among the rich or the very poor’. This is because the very rich are not eligible for, or dependent on, social housing, while the very poor ‘are more shielded from competition due to the allocation rules for social housing in the Netherlands’. As such, lower-middle income households are most likely to perceive resource competition, and the research finds that this in turn is corelated with increased support for the populist right among these households.
Thus, while the literature is reasonably small, it does provide quite robust support for the ‘resource scarcity’ hypothesis.
Outcomes for immigrants in Ireland
To provide context for the idea of resource scarcity we also need to consider, of course, the reality of immigration and housing in Ireland. Immigration is currently close to a historic high, with last year nearly returning to the 2007 peak. Moreover, while the 2007 peak was dominated by migration from within the EU, recently there has been a shift towards non-EU migration. In 2023, 22% of the population were born outside the State. Only two other EU countries had a higher level of foreign born population, and these were Malta and Cyprus, which are of course Mediterranean islands. Moreover, 109,566 people from Ukraine arrived in Ireland since Russia’s invasion.
In terms of housing, there are marked differences between Irish born and non-Irish born households (see below Table from this ESRI report).
Immigrants are much less likely to be homeowners and much more likely to be living in the PRS. A very large majority of Irish-born people own their home (77%), but only a little more than a third of non-Irish born households do (37%). 56.7% of immigrants live in the PRS, compared to just 13.8% for Irish-born households. EU-East migrants are the most likely to live in the PRS (70.8%), followed by those from outside the EU (65.8%) (Note, these figures are from the above ESRI report, which draws on EUSILC data, see the below Figure from Valesca Lima’s recent report which breaks this down by nationality drawing on Census data). Eastern Europeans also have the lowest level of homeownership (25%), despite the fact that 62.7% of them have been living in Ireland 11 to 20 years.
Migrants are also less likely to live in local authority or social housing than the Irish-born group, with only 6% doing so, compared to 9% for Irish bord households. Some non-Irish born individuals do not have a long-term right to reside and thus will not be entitled to local authority housing. The fact that allocation is in part based on a waiting list also penalizes new comers.
I have often wondered how much of the over-representation of migrants in the PRS can be explained by the fact that they are on average younger, but the ESRI report finds that the tenure differences between Irish and non-Irish born households remain when controlling for age.
Linked to their concentration in the private rental sector, migrants are much more likely to experience high housing costs: 36% of migrants spend more than 30% of their income on housing costs, compared to 9% of Irish-born residents (see below ESRI Table). When the tenure differences between the two cohorts are taken into account, the gap in housing affordability is significantly less. In other words, the affordability issues for immigrants are caused by their over-representation in the PRS.
Finally, Non-Irish nationals accounted for 46% of new single adult presentations to homeless services and 44% of families in emergency homeless accommodation in 2019 (Lima, 2025).
Consequently, all of the main issues associated with the ‘housing crisis’ (inability to purchase, affordability, homelessness) are disproportionately experienced by immigrants, which does not support the idea that migrants are outcompeting Irish-born households when it comes to housing.
Countering anti-immigrant arguments
So what does all this mean in terms of understanding anti-immigrant politics and housing? On the face of it, there are certainly reasons to think that housing scarcity could play a decisive role in Ireland. There is after all a shortage of housing, and there is international evidence supporting the ‘resource scarcity’ hypothesis. However, migrants are under-represented in social housing and homeownership, and are themselves much more likely to be impacted by lack of availability and affordability issues in the PRS, and much more likely to be homeless. If anyone is to be angry about the housing situation, it’s actually migrants themselves.
While it’s not possible to say anything conclusive, my inclination is to think that cultural factors are likely playing a more important role than housing scarcity. Consider the following:
· By far the clearest expression of anti-immigrant politics has been in relation to IPAS centres, which pose essentially zero threat in terms of housing. The focus of these protests is mainly about the alleged absence of services (GPs, schools etc.) and the ‘threat’ posed by International Protection Applicants.
· The specific groups of migrants who are most frequently targeted are those least likely to be impacting negatively on the housing system. If one is concerned about house prices, it would make much more sense to focus on immigration from the UK, the only group of immigrants who have high levels of homeownership. Likewise, if one cares about high rents, it would make a lot more sense to focus on Swedish software programmers in the Docklands than International Protection Applicants who are, in some instances, literally living in tents.
· In Europe, Populist parties talk a lot about housing, but they don’t actually have any housing policies beyond excluding foreigners. This doesn’t suggest a real concern with housing.
Most importantly, we have to remember that before resource scarcity can generate conflict between two groups, the groups themselves have to exist as socially meaningful categories. In other words, before migrants can be perceived as a threat there needs to be a pre-existing sense in which Irish people perceive themselves to be a distinct group with a shared identity and set of interests. In other words, resource scarcity isn’t purely economic but is itself embedded in a cultural distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see my previous post on the ‘moral politics of housing’.
To get back to where we started, what might all this mean for a pro-immigration response to those arguing that reduced immigration is needed to address the housing crisis? I’m not entirely sure, but two things seem likely to be true to me.
First, it seems unlikely that anti-immigration politics is primarily driven by economic issues in general, or housing scarcity in particular. In other words, it seems unlikely that addressing the housing will, in and of itself, address the issue.
Nevertheless, (second), because of scarcity, housing is the best opportunity to politicize pre-existing ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions. These distinctions are not generated by housing scarcity, they are generated by cultural constructions such as national identity. But they can be expressed or made politically salient to greater or lesser degrees, and resource scarcity is one of the most effective means for doing so.
Consequently, it will be necessary to have a coherent response to the argument that immigration must be reduced.
As far as I can see, there is only one form of argument that can be effective here and that is one that shows that reducing immigration will not lead to significantly better housing outcomes. Arguing that we shouldn’t reduce immigration to address the housing crisis because “the Government is to blame” is not very convincing, unless you are already pre-disposed to a pro-immigration position.
It seems likely that the key is to focus not just on the demand-side impacts of reducing immigration, but also the supply-side impacts. The anti-immigration position is based on a more or less static view of the housing system, in which demand can be curtailed without effecting other elements of the system. Notably, at the core of the argument is that limiting migration can reduce housing demand but will not reduce housing supply.
This does not stand up to scrutiny.
EU immigration cannot be reduced without leaving the EU, and this would certainly reduce housing supply by undermining, in various ways, Government expenditure on housing, investment in housing, the position of Irish banks, and the availability of construction workers.
International Protection Applications could be reduced, with limited impacts on supply, but this will definitely not reduce house prices or rents since people with no money don’t drive housing demand.
The only logical path would be to reduce residency permits, specifically work permits. There might be some scope for this, but it would of course have potential negative impacts on the economy and on housing supply, especially because apartment supply is closely tied with institutional investor’s focus on well paid migrant workers in Dublin and because it would reduce the availability of construction workers.
These arguments need to be developed more fully to provide a coherent and evidence informed context in which public discussion can take place. I don’t expect anti-immigrant activists to be persuaded by any amount of evidence, but more broadly a section of the public can and will form the intuitive view that high immigration must be a problem in the context of housing scarcity. Understanding more clearly the relationship between migration and housing, it seems to me, is a pre-requisite for engaging with these questions. A related challenge is to be able to counter the simple and intuitive argument for reducing immigration with an equally simple and intuitive counter-argument.
However, if cultural factors are ultimately driving ‘us and them’ concerns around housing, such as fear of cultural change or nostalgia for a more ethnically/culturally homogenous past, then these arguments need to be taken on directly in some form. The belief that these attitudes will melt away if more housing is provided seems unlikely, and anyway the housing scarcity issue looks set to be with us for a while.